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Die Entstehung der Knotentheorie. Kontexte und Konstruktionen einer modernen
mathematischen Theorie. By Moritz Epple. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden (Vieweg).
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Reviewed by Arne Schirrmacher
Hilbert-Edition, Institut fu¨r Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Humboldtallee 11, 37073 Go¨ttingen, Germany
This groundbreaking history of knots is all rich in historical narration, mathematical
content, and philosophical perspective. Although the focus is on the 19th and the firs half
of the 20th century, the book starts with knots in early human cultures and their role in
weaving mills. With Gauss and his winding number integrals measuring beknottedness
becomes a mathematical problem. Physicists’ vortex structures such as Helmholtz’s and
in particlular Thomson’s vortex atoms provide a radically different context for the same
problem. With knots at the heart of this early theory of everything, classificatio was on the
agenda, leading to Tait’s knot tables that could be seen as a periodic system of chemical
elements. Epple does not overloose the popularization of these researches and their role in
religious debate. The motivation for the study of knots changed from application (weaving)
to natural philosophy (theologically compatible views of the structure ofmatter).WithKlein
and his comment that there were no knots in four dimensions and his efforts to integrate
the topic into the theory of algebraic curves the “epistemic configuration was again shifted
considerably at the end of the classical period of knot theory when the conception of knots
being physical objects finall disintegrated.
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The second part of the book begins with an essay on modernity in mathematics that
critically discussesHerbertMehrtens’s theses [Mehrtens 1990]. Themodern inmathematics
is characterized, in general, by a split from the natural sciences, differentiation into rather
autonomous subdisciplines, professionalization, and social autonomy on the one hand as
well as the paradigmatic notions of sets, (abstract) spaces, and axioms on the other. In
distinction toMehrtens, forEpplemodernity inmathematics cannot be captured solely by the
determination of its symbolic systems and epistemic objects. Accordingly, biographical and
nonmathematical aspects of the main f gures of modern knot theory (Wirtinger, Heegaard,
Tietze, Dehn, Reidemeister, Alexander) claim some space. The historical account of the
second part startswith topology, as introduced by Poincare´, as it becomes the new systematic
place for knot theory. The theory developed initially rather unevenly in the early years of
the 20th century; later group theory entered, and f nally the knot invariants of the 1920s
f rmly establish the f eld. Reidemeister’s book of 1932 marks the zenith before the year
1933 becomes a turning point also for knot theory in Germany [Reidemeister 1932]. An
outlook on the postwar development (when knots and topology return to physics) is not part
of the book.
Epple’s Habilitationsschrift is an exemplary study of mathematization of an initially
concrete nonmathematical daily-life object within a number of different contexts that var-
ied in the respective conf gurations of objects and techniques and hence resulted in a
variety of theory constructions. This is done with a philosophic perspective that adapts
Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger’s distinction of the concepts of epistemic and technological objects
[Rheinberger 1992]. Instead of the latter, however, for the case ofmathematics Epple prefers
to speak of epistemic techniques and replaces the key notion of experimental system with
epistemic configuration. He also stresses a view of mathematics in action (a view that inter-
prets texts as traits of action) as distinct from a history of mathematical ideas or a general
history of a discipline, without reference, however, to a modern philosophical theory of
action. Instead, the reconstruction of rich chronicles of events is undertaken in order to
give a thick description (Geertz) that should allow to identify “causal explanations,” causal
in the sense that structures could be unveiled that determine constraints and possibilities
(or propensities) for mathematical actions. Probably Epple’s main conclusions within this
framework are “. . . that the construction of symbolic calculi, that was put into the center by
Mehrtens, is almost always preceded by productive imagination and adapting of complex
epistemic objects in mathematical action . . . and that symbolic formalism in some contribu-
tions to modern mathematics was rather an artifact to the written texts than a distinguished
feature of the productive action” (p. 393). Clearly, on f rst reading the reader will capitulate
on one front line of discussion or other. To grasp the detailed historic development is one
thing, to identify the epistemic conf gurations and the signatures of modernity at the same
time another. Furthermore, marked parts of the text require some thorough mathematical
knowledge and footnotes frequently present a second text. Consequently, this book asks for
thorough study but it also delivers in turn rewarding answers. It still leaves room for a more
concise history of knot theory, preferably written in English.
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La rivoluzione dimenticata. Il pensiero scientifico greco e la scienza moderna. By
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Reviewed by Reviel Netz
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The “Revolution” referred to in Russo’s title is no less than the Scientif c Revolution.
Hardly forgotten, readers might say. In fact, so Russo claims with great persuasive vigor,
we have forgotten the true time and place this revolution took place. This was not West-
ern Europe of the 16th–17th centuries, but the eastern Mediterranean of the third century
B.C. Russo bases his argument on an interpretation of the scientif c method. Essentially,
this is a Popperian version of the hypothetico-deductive model, consisting of construct-
ing theoretical domains, producing conclusions according to mathematical reasoning, and
interpreting and testing those conclusions by appealing to empirical realizations. He ar-
gues that all the components of this method were put in place in the Hellenistic world: so
this is when science came to be. Not in the Classical period. (This did not have empirical
realizations, and it merely anticipated the achievements of the Hellenistic world in math-
ematical reasoning.) Nor later than the third century B.C. (as the shadow of the Roman
Empire grows, Russo detects a steep intellectual decline). Certainly not at the so-called
scientif c revolution—which merely brought back to life the Hellenistic methods it knew
from its literary sources. (Often—a theme of Russo’s approach—these sources were made
in Roman times, mere second-rate ref ections of Hellenistic achievements.)
The book is among a handful of truly marvelously written books in the f eld of early
science (Van der Waerden’s Science Awakening immediately comes to mind), and it was
accordingly a great success with the Italian public. The community of historians of math-
ematics should be grateful for Russo for this achievement, and should hope that the book
gets quickly translated into other major languages. It will serve as excellent reading in
a survey of the history of science, besides of course offering an important thesis, well
worth our critical attention. There are many particular points I welcome in Russo’s book,
of which I now mention just three. First, it belongs to a new wave of studies of Greek
mathematics, where emphasis shifts from the Classical antecedents to the Hellenistic ex-
tant sources themselves. As this shift gets us from speculation into facts, it is of obvious
methodological value. (For this shift in general, see [Saito 1998].) Second, Russo is right, I
think, to highlight a problem that was largely overlooked by the scholarship—that is, how
exactly did Greek science get forgotten? From Roman times right through the 17th cen-
tury, throughout the history of Mediterranean and European civilizations, to do science was
to study Greeks. Authors as different from each other as Vitruvius, Avicenna, or Newton
